Abstract-Nowadays
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets, mainly formed by compromised machines which are infected by various ways such as worms and Trojans, are engaged in malicious activities like DDOS, Spam and etc. It is recently considered as one of the most important threats to the Internet security. From SANS security report 2008 [1] , the Botnet is listed at 2th out of 10 crucial risks in the new millennium.
In recent years the newly-evolved P2P botnets are flourishing in the Internet. Partly because the "traditional" ones, such as IRC and HTTP botnets, are now easily detected or controlled by taking measurements on the Command and Control(C&C) servers, while in P2P network, every peer serves as both client and server, which made it influence little by single-point(server) failure. Also, the new P2P botnets are using new techniques like Rootkits, Fast-flux and etc. One example is Storm Botnet, appeared in early 2007 [2] and quickly developed to the "biggest" botnet of the Internet world. It indicates a more sophisticated P2P approach by using an embedded decentralized architecture. As its threats to the Internet Security are increasing, searching for detecting and mitigating methods has become urgent. Therefore, in this paper, 1) we present a brief overview of Storm's mechanism; 2) we propose a novel real-time detecting model-MSFM (Multi-Stream Fused Model). In this model, we incorporate different detecting methods based on unique characteristics of network flow packets.
Firstly, MSFM lays emphasis on the UDP flow, which is most related with the botnet C&C (Command and Control). We use the Hurst Parameter to retrieve the whole condition, and detect the abnormality based on the UDP packets' self-similarity. Secondly, MSFM applies the discrete Kalman filter to find ICMP and SMTP packets' anomaly and Multi-chart CUSUM acts as the amplifier to make the abnormality clearer. Finally, we consider the impact on the botnet detection which web applications generate, especially the P2P applications, and use the properties of TCP flow to analyze that the abnormalities are caused by the botnets or the P2P applications. In addition, this paper uses the Kaufman algorithm to dynamically adjust the threshold to minimize the false positives and false negatives. After series of experiments, the results prove that the model can detect the Storm botnet in a relatively high precision with both low false-positive and false-negative rate.
II. RELATED WORK
Current research works on decentralized P2P botnets are still at the beginning stage:
Julian B. Gizzard et al. [3] study and analyze the storm's mechanism thoroughly, including the infection steps, communication ways and so forth, which is valuable for later studies.
Sandeep Sarat et al. [4] and Thorsten Holz et al. [5] analyze and monitor the Storm in a similar way. The former draws the conclusion: the distribution of peer IDs of Storm is irregular and there are many unreachable/private IPs. The later offers a novel botnet mitigation thought-infilter into the Overnet network as a peer and publish large number of keys to delay or disrupt the communication between bots.
Reference [6] present some of the behavior characteristics of the P2P botnets, and offer thoughts of controlling bots on hosts, such as using the System Service Table (SST) Hooking and etc.
Metthew STEGGINK et al. [7] analyze the botnets' net flow, found some unique characteristics of Storm when comparing them with other software's net flow.
In SRI technical report [8] , Phillip Porras et al. present a penetrating analysis in Storm's logic, and provoke the Dialog-based Detecting Method-using Snort for discovering the dialogs and BotHunter for matching up later.
Carlton R.Davis et al. [9] use Sybil attacks to mitigate Storm botnet-infiltrate the botnet with large number of fake nodes (sybils) to reroute or disrupt "real" C&C traffic.
Brent ByungHoon Kang et al. [10] develop the Passive P2P Monitor (PPM) to enumerate the infected hosts in the Storm botnet regardless whether or not they are behind a firewall or NAT.
Reference [11] proposed a structured-P2P-based botnet detection strategy through the aggregation and stability analysis of network traffic, considering that the flows related to the structured-P2P-based bot exhibit stability on statistical meaning due to the impartial position in botnet and performing pre-programmed control activities automatically. And they develop a small flowaggregation extraction subsystem to exclude a majority of flows unlikely for C&C ahead of stability detection.
Reference [12] presented a new general detection framework which currently focuses on P2P based and IRC based botnets. The framework is based on definition of botnets: a group of bots that perform similar communication and malicious activity patterns within the same botnet. And there is no need for prior knowledge of botnets such as botnet signature in the framework.
Above all, researches in decentralized botnets detecting are still in a beginning period. It is difficult for most of the studies to identify that whether the net flow characteristics and the host behaviors are led by botnets or normal activities.
III. BACKGROUND: P2P BOTNET AND STORM BOTNET
Recent years have witnessed an increasingly appearance of various P2P botnets-trying to "borrow" the P2P networks as their communication tools. Storm is a new P2P botnet based on Kademlia algorithm [13] and used the complete decentralized architecture for C&C. It is hard to detect partly because its communication channel is encrypted. More importantly, new techniques like fast-flux, rootkit and even anti-reverse engineering are used into this botnet.
The Storm infection and communication could be briefly divided into two different phases -the "Bot Initialization" and the "Secondary Injection".
In the initializing step, the worm's executable binary is downloaded by users from their email boxes. Then it makes several configurations to prepare for the "secondary injection" part, such as opening up several ports for later communication. The worm tries to contact the other peers from an encoded list, which is in the initial downloaded worm binaries. If successful, it joins into the Overnet/eDonkey net as well as steps into the second phase. In this phase, the bot uses hard coded keys to search on Overnet and download a value, which is an encrypted URL that points to the location of a secondary injection executables. The bot decrypts the value with its hard coded key and follows the executable directions such as upgrading, email spamming or others likewise.
Within the two phases, some unique network flow characteristics are worth noticing: 1) the number of UDP packets is also detected sharply increasing because Storm are using them for publishing itself in the Overnet, peer discovery, and other functions, as depicted in Fig. 3 Section V. 2) When initializing, the bot randomly sends requests to connect to the other peers, thus leads to an unusual amount of ICMP "Destination unreachable" packets, which are rarely seen in regular circumstances. 3) As in [7] , the number of SMTP packets is in a rising trend when botnets are activated.
Besides, unique characteristics are detected in UDP packets [5] : 1) Most packets are fixed sized. 2) Same message type is found when compromised machine are connecting to other bots.
3) The storm used the same source port in controlling and communicating.
These characteristics are symbolization for the existence of bots. In this paper, we propose MSFM, which deal with different flows in different methods, to detect them.
IV. MSFM: MULTI-STREAM FUSED MODEL
MSFM is designed to provide real-time and accurate detection for indicating the existence of P2P botnets. The detecting procedure is in the following steps, as shown in Figure 1 .
To begin with, we detect the abnormality in packets (UDP, ICMP and SMTP) numbers using discrete Kalman filter. Then for UDP flow specifically, we analyze its self-similarity: lower self-similarity indicates the bot existence. For ICMP and SMTP flow, Multi-chart CUSUM is adopted as an amplifier to clarify the abnormalities. Meanwhile, considering the impact on the botnet detection which web applications generate, especially the P2P applications, we use the characteristics 
A. UDP Flow
In the paper, we lay emphasis on the UDP flow, because it is most related with the C&C (Command and Control) of botnet. We use the Hurst Parameter to obtain the whole condition of it.
Self-Similarity
In the subsection, we will use the self-similarity to analyze the whole condition of UDP flow.
In 1994, Leland et al. [14] demonstrated that Ethernet LAN traffic is statistically self-similar after analysis on the Bellcore, which is different from the previous Poisson processes (which is short-range dependence). Beran et al. declared that the Variable-Bit-Rate (VBR) video traffic is also self-similar [15, 16] . Furthermore, from the research about WAN [17] , FASTPAC [18] and other network, we can see that the network traffic has an inherent feature: selfsimilarity. In this paper, the self-similarity property of UDP flow [19] is used, because the C&C of botnet is mainly about UDP flow, so it is able to reveal the properties of botnet clearer.
The self-similarity refers to a scale invariance property, which intuitively means that plots of traffic intensity at different time-scales look very similar.
Let X(t) (such as the number of UDP packets) be a stochastic process. If the following equation is always true for all a>0, then X(t) is self-similar.
The "=" represents that they are equal in the statistical sense. That's to say, if the statistical properties of the process X(t) remain unchanged after it is compressed or extended in timescale, then X(t) has self-similarity. And H in (1) represents the degree of self-similarity, which is called the Hurst Parameter. A value of H closer to 1 means a larger degree of self-similarity or long range dependence (LRD).
As mentioned in Section III, Storm botnet causes abnormities in network flows: the number of UDP packets will increase because of communication between bots, which will weaken the self-similarity of UDP flow. Because the Hurst Parameter represents the degree of self-similarity, the change of Hurst Parameter will reveal the abnormities of UDP flow. Thus, we sampling the UDP flow, and calculate the Hurst Parameter of it. The value of Hurst Parameter closer to 0.5 means abnormities.
Finally, we define a function to decide the UDP abnormities:
M UDP is a threshold, and it adjusts dynamically as introduced in Section IV D. fH i =1 means that the UDP flow is abnormal.
There are many method to calculate the Hurst Parameter, such as the rescaled range(R/S) method, variance-time plots(VTP) method, the Whittle's Estimator method and so on. Basis on the previous research [20, 21] , we choose the R/S method, which is more stable and less affected by the parameters.
For a given time series 
2) Calculate the standard deviation(S m ) of every subsequence:
3) Calculate R m of every subsequence:
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Accord to the research, the relationship between
and the length of subsequence (n) when n → ∞ can be expressed as:
where C is a positive constant independent of n, and H is Hurst Parameter. Take the logarithm on both sides of the equation (8):
where log C is a positive constant independent of n.
A graph could be plotted taking the log n R S ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠ as longitudinal coordinates, log n as the abscissa. A line can be achieved after linear fitting, and the slope of this line is H.
To enhance the algorithm's real-time performance, we use a slide window to improve the R/S method, which is presented in reference [22] .
B. ICMP and SMTP Flow
In the section, we will use the discrete Kalman filter to find ICMP and SMTP flow anomaly, and Multi-chart CUSUM acts as the amplifier to make the abnormality clearer.
Discrete Kalman Filter
The discrete Kalman filter estimates a process by using a form of feedback control: the filter estimates the process state at some time and then obtains feedback in the form of (noisy) measurements. So, the equations for the Kalman filter fall into two groups: time update equations and measurement update equations. The time update equations are responsible for projecting forward (in time) the current state and error covariance estimates to obtain a priori estimate for the next time step. The measurement update equations are responsible for the feedback-for incorporating a new measurement into the priori estimate to obtain an improved posteriori estimate [23, 24] . The time update equations can be thought of as predictor equations, and the measurement update equations can be thought of as corrector equations .And the posteriori estimate is the result of the Kalman Filter.
We assume that the current time step is k.
1) Discrete Kalman filter time update equations
The priori estimate (
is calculated given knowledge of the process prior to step k:
where 1| 1 k k X − − is the posteriori estimate at step k-1,
represents the control input, A and B are system parameters.
The priori estimate error covariance of
where 1| 1 k k P − − is the posteriori estimate error covariance
A represents the transposed matrix of A. Q is the process noise covariance. So, the time update equations project the state and covariance estimates forward from time step k-1 to step k.
2) Discrete Kalman filter measurement update equations
The posteriori estimate (
knowledge of the measurement k Z and
where H is the system parameter for measurement. And Kg is the Kalman Gain, which is calculated as following:
where ' H represents the transposed matrix of H. R is the measurement noise covariance.
The posteriori estimate error covariance of
is calculated as following:
where I is an identity matrix. After each time and measurement update pair, the process is repeated with the previous posteriori estimates used to project or predict the new priori estimates. That is, (12) , and (11) is substituted by | k k P in (14) . As mentioned in Section III, Storm botnet causes abnormities in network flows. The number of UDP, ICMP and SMTP packets are all increasing because of communication between bots, spamming or some other behaviors. Thus, we choose these 3 abnormal changes, turn them into proportion of net flow, and calculate the posteriori estimate of the proportions with the discrete Kalman filter (assuming that the current time step is k):
| k k X can depict network flow characteristics more precisely than the only measurement. Further more, the discrete Kalman filter is real-time. Hence, if i λ increases, it implies that the network flow characteristic estimated by the discrete Kalman filter is abnormal. To make the increment clearer, we use Multi-chart CUSUM on the output of discrete Kalman filter (which will be introduced below).
Multi-chart CUSUM
Internet traffic could be viewed as a complex random model: any abnormity in the traffic will bring obvious changes. However, since the observation series are blurred in the Internet security issues, it is hard to build up a specific model. For this reason, a nonparametric CUSUM (NP-CUSUM) that uses minimum a priori information is needed for abnormity detection. [25, 26] Moreover, more details in net flow changing are needed in the botnet detection, so multi-chart NP-CUSUM detection algorithm is used for multi-factor detection in the network. [27] Now, we use the output of discrete Kalman 
where M is a threshold, and it will be adjusted dynamically as introduced in Section IV D.
C. TCP Flow
The new decentralized botnets are very similar to the traditional P2P applications, so the abnormalities mentioned above are also possibly caused by the traditional P2P applications in the network. Thus, some method is needed to analyze that the abnormalities are caused by the botnet or the P2P applications.
The normal P2P applications always use the UDP packets to transfer the control information, and use the long TCP packets (the size is always bigger than 1300 bytes) to transfer the data. As mentioned is Section III, the botnet only has the process of C&C with UDP packet. And the only data transmission of botnet is the "secondary injection" process, which is transferred by the HTTP protocol and the data volume is small.
So, we will statistics the proportions of the long TCP packets-P TCP , the size of which is above 1300 bytes. The value of P TCP smaller means the abnormalities mentioned above are more possibly caused by the botnet.
Let N TCP represents the number of the long TCP packets; the value of N TCP is 0 in the beginning.
Monitoring every TCP packet P i : 1) If the destination port of P i is well known ports, such as 80(HTTP), 21(FTP) and so on, then deal with the next TCP packet P i+1 . Otherwise, go to step 2);
2) Use the Deep Packet Inspection(DPI) [28] to deal with TCP packets. If P i belongs to a known P2P application, such as BT，eMule, Skype and so on, then deal with the next TCP packet P i+1 . Otherwise, go to step 3);
3) If the size of P i is bigger than 1300 bytes, then N TCP = N TCP +1. Otherwise deal with the next TCP packet P i+1 .
At last, we define a decision function:
N total is the total number of TCP packets. M TCP is a threshold, and it adjusts dynamically as introduced in Section IV D. fP TCP =1 means that the abnormalities mentioned above are more possibly caused by botnet.
D. Dynamic threshold adjusting
Enlightened by Load-Shedding method and using the Kaufman algorithm [29] , we adjust the threshold dynamically to improve the detection precision. 
And
, we can get the final
where 1, , i n = … . In this way, threshold could be
E. Process of MSFM
The process of MSFM (shown in Fig. 1 ) is: 1) Retrieve data from monitoring device, and turn them into proportions-C UDP , C ICMP , C SMTP . And deal with the TCP flow, we get fP TCP .
2) Calculate the posteriori estimate of the proportions with the discrete Kalman filter-λ UDP , λ ICMP , λ SMTP .
3) Deal with different packets in different strategies. 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The environment is set up following paper [7] . It consists of a protected net. Several hosts are logging the traffic with the Wireshark. Some of the hosts are served as bots in storm botnet.
A. Netflow Comparison
In experiment A, we monitor the net flows under different situations. The sample packets are gathered every 10 seconds. After running normally for a while, Storm bots are injected into the network.
From the 280th seconds, as illustrated in Fig. 3 , the number of UDP packets increases dramatically from 49 to 1689 for the reason that the bots are communicating using UDP packets. Meanwhile, the ICMP packets also showed a skyrocketing trend when bots were activated (from 100 to 700). Few SMTP packets were found in our experiment due to the time delay for spamming, so we don't consider them in the below experiment. Therefore, we can see that it is the botnet communication mechanism that decides the increasing of UDP and ICMP packet number, which has critical significance for measurements.
B. Self-Similarity Experiment
In experiment B, we will observe the change of the Hurst Parameter of UDP packets. In regular circumstances, the Hurst Parameter will keep a relatively stable value interval, which is from 0.65 to 0.85. It may fluctuate, but usually in a small range.
From Fig.4 , after the storm worms are injected to the network, the Hurst Parameter of UDP packets decreased sharply down to nearly 0.51 at t=420s and even to 0.41 at the lowest point when t=460s. And it fluctuates acutely because of the periodic behaviors in C&C. Hurst parameter can clearly indicate the UDP flow abnormal increasing caused by bots communication.
C. Multi-chart CUSUM Experiment
In experiment C, we use the output of ICMP and SMTP data packets in discrete Kalman filter as the input of multi-chart CUSUM to enlarge the difference and improve the measure precision. We take the ICMP data packet as our experimental example. From Fig. 3 , at t=290s, ICMP packets began sharply increase, but in Fig.  5 , at t=310s, Multi-chart CUSUM detected it with little delay. It proves that the model is sensitive enough to detect the activated bots in the real-time network.
D. False-positive and False-negative Comparison
Experiment D is mainly to compare the algorithm's false-positive and false-negative rate with previous works. We define the model from paper [30] as M-CUSUM, model from paper [31] as KCFM, and MSFM without TCP deep packet inspection as MSFM-T. We select five groups of data, which are using different combination of protocols and net flow rates, especially the variation of flow intensity in p2p applications. The first 3 samples are From Table 1 , the detecting precision of our MSFM is desirable, as its false-positive and false-negative rate in sample 1 and 2 (normal office environment) are approximating to the real situation. However, in the third group of experiment, we add the P2P application such that the network background flow consists of a large amount of P2P protocols packets. In this case, all models show error reports. The M-CUSUM model only using CUSUM algorithm has a relatively high false-positive rate; the KCFM model which combines Kalman filter and CUSUM obtained a reduced false-positive rate, and the MSFM-T model has even lower ERR since the selfsimilarity model is added into the system. MSFM, equipped with TCP deep packet inflection functions, can differentiate normal P2P application data flow and the botnet C&C flow. Even under the extreme condition, it also performs well in a relatively low false-positive rate.
In the fourth experiment, we add bot attacking flow in normal network environment without P2P applications. All the four models have relatively low false-negative rate. In the fifth experiment, we add normal P2P flows based on the fourth experiment and all models shows the situation of false-negative and false-positive. For instance, the M-CUSUM detects 133 times of attack in total with 79 correct. KCFM and MSFM-T reduce the falsenegative times from 133 to 128 with 83 correct and 125 with 83 correct, respectively. TCP deep packet inflection function in MSFM will further differentiates the normal network flow and botnets flow, thus MSFM can detect P2P botnets more accurately and effectively with reduced false-positive and false-negative rates.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we briefly described the infection and communication mechanism of new P2P botnet, and presented its unique characteristics. In order to accurately detect this botnet, we propose a novel real-time detecting model-MSFM (Multi-Stream Fused Model). We deal with different types of packets in different methods: detecting increasing number of UDP, ICMP and SMTP packets by discrete Kalman filter; amplifying the results by multi-chart CUSUM; detecting UDP packets using self-similarity; and improving detection precision using Kaufman algorithm to dynamically adjust the threshold. Furthermore, we considered the web applicationsgenerated impacts on the botnet detection, especially the P2P applications, and differentiated normal flow with botnet communications. The results is good within detecting, false-positive and false-negative experiment, which prove that proposed model has its own advantages in accurately detecting this new botnets on experimented network platform. We are planning to improve the detecting precision in large-scale network environment, and try to mitigate its harm to the Internet. 
